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Recently, some have claimed that names are predicates, and that their semantic content 
involves the concept of being called. This concept is often assumed to be a meta-linguistic 
concept, and if so, then names must be predicates with meta-linguistic content. However, 
meta-linguistic theories of the content of any expression fail to be informative and cannot 
accommodate cross-linguistic translation. Fara argues, however, for a different concept of 
being called that is not a meta-linguistic concept, and therefore a predicativist calling account 
of names need not be subject to such criticisms. Fara argues that the concept of being called 
can be understood in terms of attributing properties. I argue, however, that this view is subject 
to several flaws. First, I show that the arguments Fara offers for the property attribution 
concept of being called can equally be used to derive at least two other concepts of being 
called, and that therefore Fara’s account of names as predicates is not sufficiently justified. 
Second, Fara is offering an argument by analogy as she makes explicit. I point out some 
significant differences between names and predicates, which casts doubt on her claim that 
names are analogous to predicates, or least those she compares them to. Third, the account 
fails to be informative, just as meta-linguistic accounts do, given a flawed interpretation of 
what it is to be informative. Fourth, acts of property attribution seem to be as capricious as 
acts of addressing individuals with certain expressions, something Fara claims is a reason 
for rejecting meta-linguistic accounts. Last, the attributive account also entails an implausible 
explanation of the act of giving a name. I claim this is the result of an anemic conception of 
the nature of meta-linguistic actions. I suggest an alternative account of acts of giving names 
that is, in fact, meta-linguistic in nature, but is not subject to previous criticisms, since it is not 
offered as a theory of a name's content, but of the initial fixing of its reference. I argue in fact 
that an account of giving names must be meta-linguistic, and that a more robust concept of 
the nature of meta-linguistic speech acts is needed. I offer a sketch of such an account based 
on Austin's performative-constative distinction. 
 
1. Introduction 
It seems undeniable, at some level, that a proper name is an expression that has a specific 
individual as its semantic content. Historically, debates about proper names took this 
assumption for granted. The controversy concerned whether a name had its semantic content 
by denoting a specific individual via some complex uniquely identifying description or via 
some more direct non-descriptive semantic mechanism – that of reference.  
 The referentialist view is traditionally believed to be rooted in the work of the nineteenth 
century philosopher Mill (1843). 50 years later, however, while science, mathematics, and 
logic were undergoing serious revision, Mill’s ideas were rejected in favor of the descriptive 
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thesis, nascent in Frege’s work (1892) and explicitly developed in Russell’s work (1905). This 
theory enjoyed the status as the received view, again for roughly 50 years, due to its 
perceived advantages for rejecting certain metaphysical theories. However, as natural 
language was increasingly becoming a subject of philosophical interest in and of itself, 
epitomized in Austin’s 1955 lectures and subsequent work (1962), descriptivism came under 
scrutiny, culminating in its near complete rejection due to devastating criticisms offered by 
Kripke in his 1970 lectures and their subsequent publication in 1980, though descriptivism 
had already been rejected by Marcus much earlier (1961). This prompted a return to the idea 
that names ought to be understood on a referentialist model – as directly referring to 
individuals rather than denoted via some uniquely identifying description. 
 More recently, though not without precedent, some have started to question whether 
names stand for individuals at all – whether directly or indirectly. Instead, what is suggested 
is that the semantic type of a proper name is, in fact, the very same as that of a predicate – 
also known as the “predicativist” thesis about proper names. As compelling as the thought of 
a name as quintessential subject might be, as it turns out, speakers do use natural language 
in ways that give credence to the predicativist thesis. In terms of their compositional nature – 
their semantic type – this is not particularly problematic, as predicates are nominalized 
regularly, and this has a well-developed compositional explanation. However, how to offer a 
predicativist analysis of the semantic content of proper names is not as clear.  
 In assessing potential predicativist analyses, the standard theory of a predicate’s 
semantic value will be assumed to be correct – that they are expressions that have functions 
as their semantic values, taking certain types of expressions as arguments, and producing a 
sentence with the semantic value of either true or false. Applying a predicate to an argument 
produces a sentence that is true just in case that argument’s semantic content is a member 
of the set that satisfies whatever a predicate’s semantic content demands. The standard set 
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theoretic theory of a predicate’s semantic content as the set of any potential argument’s 
semantic content that occurs in a true sentence will also be assumed. These sets 
philosophers often call “properties.”  
 The predicativist theory of names, then, at least holds that names are of the semantic 
type predicate and that their semantic content is that of a property. Typical evidence for this 
claim relies on the existence of grammatical sentences in which names function as if they are 
expressions with the semantic type of a predicate. More specifically, that of a general 
predicate that applies to multiple individuals. Therefore, contemporary predicativism is also 
committed to the claim that names are general predicates having a property that more than 
one individual can have as their semantic content.  
 There are at least two accounts of the semantic content a name might have if it is a 
general predicate: a meta-linguistic account and a non-meta-linguistic account, each of which 
can be further analyzed as either bearer or calling accounts, and even further as either 
descriptive or demonstrative. For several reasons, I focus on non-meta-linguistic predicativist 
calling accounts as the only serious contenders as a theory of the meaning of proper names 
– of their semantic type and content. The most recent and most well-developed predicativist 
non-meta-linguistic calling account of the meaning of proper names is due to Fara (2011a, 
2011b, 2015). I argue, however, that it has at least three separate flaws that must be 
addressed.  
 In the next section, I explain the motivations and evidence for predicativism both 
historical and current. In Section 3, I give a general description of meta-linguistic 
predicativism, and describe the most common objections to it. Section 4 describes different 
notions of calling and their role in accounts of predicativist accounts. It also offers reasons for 
focusing on one account specifically – the attributive non-meta-linguistic calling account. I 
then, briefly, in Section 5, describe three advantages of that account. Section 6 examines the 
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argument for this analysis of the notion of calling and raises concerns about it, and section 7 
does the same concerning using this notion of calling as a predicativist analysis of a name’s 
semantic content. Section 8 raises more general concerns about the view on which I here 
focus. Finally, in section 9 I offer a sketch of an alternative explanation of the data presented 
in favor of that view -- what I call a “meta-linguistic performative” account of acts of naming 
developed elsewhere (Savage ms., 2020a). 
2. Motivations for Predicativism 
The original inspiration for predicativism begins with Quine’s work (1953) in which he deems 
that names must be predicates to resolve issues concerning the meaning of certain empty 
names. Quine, however, never develops the idea. In fact, given what Quine says about 
names as predicates, they could be predicates that apply only to one single individual.  
Contemporary predicativism is motivated, however, not by any philosophical puzzles, but 
instead by our actual use of linguistic expressions such as proper names, which does suggest 
that they do in fact get used like predicates, and that are used as general, not singular 
predicates.1 For instance, consider the sentences 
              (1) Some Donalds are chatterboxes, and 
              (2) All Donalds eat potato chips.  
 
In sentences (1) and (2) the name ‘Donald’ is bound by quantifiers and it also occurs plurally. 
If these sentences are sensible and grammatical, as they appear to be, then the name 
‘Donald’ is arguably an expression with the semantic type of a predicate, since only predicates 
that are common nouns require binding when they occur in the subject position of a 
 
1 See Burge 1973; Bach 2015; Elbourne 2005; Elugardo 2002; Fara 2015; Geurts 1997; Gray 
2013; Izumi 2013; Katz 2001; Larson and Segal 1995; Matushansky 2008; Pietroski 2010; 
Sawyer 2010; Sloat 1969. 
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sentence.2 This observation about linguistic usage forms the basis of the contemporary 
motivation for predicativism of which there is more than one type. 
3. Meta-linguistic Predicativism 
Meta-linguistic predicativism makes the mentioning of a name itself part of its semantic 
content. On these accounts, to have a certain name is simply for it to be true that that name 
– as a linguistic item – is applied to a group of individuals. The property that serves as a 
name’s semantic content then is a relational or extrinsic property holding between individuals 
and a name in virtue of our linguistic practices – that of being an individual to which a name 
is applied. There are two ways of that the concept of having a name is understood on this 
view. The first analysis is that to have a certain name is to bear that name. The second is that 
to have a certain name is be an individual who is called by that name. Both versions generate 
from worries about informativeness originally directed at the calling account by Kripke (1980), 
as well one arising from Fara’s examination of the account (2011b).  
3.1 Meta-Linguistic Predicativism as Uninformative 
Kripke’s standard for an informative analysis of a name’s semantic content is that it should 
enlighten a speaker concerning what determines a name’s referent in a way that, in principle, 
a speaker could then use to identify that name’s referent. That is, an informative account of 
an expression’s semantic content is that it ought to identify what that expression stands for 
or represents. Meta-linguistic predicativism fails to do so because the analysis of the property 
expressed by a name mentions that name in its analysis. This entails that to apply a particular 
name correctly, a speaker would have to know already what property that name expressed.  
 
2 There are distinct types of examples used by predicativists to show that it is true, and 
different examples will suggest different accounts. Because Fara’s examples involve bound 
uses of names, and that is the account on which I will focus, I have mentioned only on these 
types of examples. I address more of these types in another manuscript 2020(b). 
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 The bearer account, however, is prone to this worry in another way as well, however, 
since to have it that the relation that holds between a name and an individual who has it, is 
that expressed by the concept of bearing that name, seems the nearly same as the concept 
of simply having a property. If this is correct, then relying on the bearing relation to illuminate 
how individuals are related to names they have, then it fails. 
 Concerning calling accounts, Kripke argues that analyzing the name ‘Donald’ as being 
called ‘Donald’ is as informative as stating that the semantic content of the expression ‘quark’ 
is whatever is called a ‘quark’. This analysis also fails to identify what an expression stands 
for or represents. Kripke therefore concludes that calling versions of the meta-linguistic 
account of a proper name’s semantic content are uninformative (1980: 68-70). And the reason 
is the general fact that the meta-linguistic account mentions the relevant expression itself in 
its application condition. The concept of being called however could still potentially illuminate 
what it is to have a name, however.  
3.2 The Predictive Inadequacy of the Calling Version of Meta-linguistic Predicativism   
To show that the calling version of meta-linguistic predicativism is inadequate, Fara (2011b) 
considers the following two sentences:  
              (3) Quine is called ‘Willard’ 
              (4) Quine is called Willard. 
 
If the calling version of meta-linguistic predicativism were correct, then sentences (3) and (4) 
should have the same truth values, assuming sentence (3) simply sloppily ignores the use-
mention distinction. But Fara claims otherwise. According to Fara, sentence (3) might be 
false, while sentence (4) could still be true. Sentence (3) might be false because it is possible 
that Quine was never addressed using the expression ‘Willard’. He may have always been 
addressed using the expression ‘Will’ instead. Still, even if Quine was never addressed using 
the name ‘Willard’, this is nevertheless still his name. That is, sentence (4) is true even if 
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sentence (3) is false. The calling version of the meta-linguistic account, then, cannot predict 
this outcome and is therefore flawed.  
 In addition, according to Fara, the meta-linguistic account also cannot predict the 
relative stability of an individual’s name over time. The reason is that meta-linguistic calling – 
that of being addressed as – is too unconstrained. Anyone can address any individual in any 
way they choose but doing so does not therefore change that individual’s name. Actual 
language use is subject to whim in certain circumstances, but having a particular name is not 
subject to just any speaker’s whim. Therefore, there must be more to having a name than 
simply being called that name in the meta-linguistic sense – that of being addressed as. 
4. Non-Meta-Linguistic Predicativism 
The idea of giving an account of names as predicates that are non-meta-linguistic has its 
roots in Burge’s work (1973). According to Burge (p. 340), “a proper name is (literally) true of 
an object just in case that object is given that name in an appropriate way.” In this instance, 
we can see that Burge is committed to the idea that a proper name is a predicative expression 
that has as its semantic content a property that applies to individuals. Furthermore, it is a 
property that is literally true of an object. Now, why would Burge use the expression ‘literally’ 
in his predicativist thesis? The answer is not clear, but it seems reasonable to assume that 
its occurrence is not accidental.  
 While Burge himself is non-committal concerning the specific relation that holds 
between a name and those that have it, he says only that they are “given,” he does use the 
word ‘literally’ in his description of how name predicates apply, and there is likely some reason 
for this. One way to take this use of the word is to suggest the idea that, in applying a name-
predicate, we attribute a property to an individual that is more substantive than one that 
applies simply in virtue of linguistic practices – meta-linguistic properties. Instead, a name’s 
semantic content has to do with non-meta-linguistic properties. For this reason, non-meta-
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linguistic predicativists do not mention, but instead use a name in their account of its semantic 
content.  
 I will focus on the calling version of non-meta-linguistic predicativism for 2 reasons: 
First, the informativeness objection to a non-meta-linguistic bearer account would apply 
equally well to its meta-linguistic cousin. Second, the idea that the semantic content of a name 
would involve the concept of calling in some way or other seems plausible in a way that it 
does not for other expressions. In fact, even referentialist accounts of a name’s semantic 
content involve this concept, at least generally, since referentialist accounts typically invoke 
the idea that names are for referring to individuals – plausibly understood as a kind of calling. 
The difference, however, which is not insignificant, is that for non-predicativists, being a 
device for referring – a type of calling that entails that an expression is singular – is part of 
the nature of a name’s semantic type and its semantic content. This is false on the non-meta-
linguistic calling account. The most recent, and well-developed non-meta-linguistic calling 
account, due to Fara, relies on the idea that to call someone a name is to attribute to that 
individual a particular property, which Fara dubs the “attributive” account. 
4.1 The Attributive Notion of Calling 
Fara uses a number of different examples that illustrate the existence of the notion of calling 
that involves property attributions. This notion of calling she then claims should be used in an 
analysis of the semantic content of a proper name. That there is such an attributive notion is 
illustrated by considering the content of the following sentences: 
              (5) Maude is called ‘stupid’ 
              (6) Maude is called stupid. 
 
Imagine that Maude is brilliant, but that she is sometimes ironically addressed as ‘stupid’ by 
her co-workers. The occurrence of the expression ‘called’ in sentence (5), then, denotes the 
activity of using a certain linguistic expression ‘stupid’ to address a particular individual 
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Maude. Sentence (5)’s truth, then, depends entirely upon the use of linguistic expressions. In 
sentence (6), however, the expression ‘called’ denotes a different activity that has to do with 
making assertions about an individual’s properties. In uttering sentence (6), a speaker does 
not address Maude with the expression stupid but instead “calls” her stupid – attributes the 
property of being stupid to her. Since Maude is brilliant, sentence (6) would therefore be false. 
And it would be false not because of anything to do with the use of any linguistic expressions, 
at least not directly, but rather because of the properties Maude has independently of how 
she is addressed.3 
 Fara uses these examples to show that if the only notion of calling were a meta-
linguistic notion, then a difference in truth value between sentence’s (5) and (6) should not 
be possible. In fact, sentence (6) should not even count as well-formed. That there are two 
notions of calling is also illustrated by the fact that Maude can surely respond to a friend who 
utters sentence (7) by uttering the following sensical and grammatical sentence: 
              (7) You can call me ‘stupid’, just don’t call me stupid. 
Sentence (7) makes perfect sense, and if so, Fara must be correct that calling is not a uniform 
concept. It not only involves addressing individuals with certain expressions, but also involves 
attributing properties to them. 
 Yet another reason to accept an attributive concept of calling is that ordinary 
predicates can be described in multiple ways. For instance, as Fara points out, we can ascribe 
the property of being stupid to someone by saying that this person is dim-witted or dumb. 
Consider for instance the following sentence: 
              (8) Maude is called dumb.  
 
3 Bach (2002) also points out this distinction, but he does not develop the view in the detail 
that Fara does. 
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Sentence (8) fails to contain the word ‘stupid’ but shares the same meaning as sentence (6). 
Maude, then, can be called stupid without using the word ‘stupid’ at all. However, if calling 
were inherently meta-linguistic, then, sentences (6) and (8) could not have the same meaning, 
since they would contain different expressions and would therefore be true in virtue of facts 
about whether certain expressions occur sentences (6) and (8), not in facts about Maude’s 
properties. But intuitively, sentences (6) and (8) do have the same meaning. Again, showing 
that there is more to calling than the meta-linguistic understanding of that concept. 
4.2 The Predicativist’s Attributive Account of Proper Names  
While the meta-linguistic account analyzes the semantic content of a name as relating an 
individual to a linguistic item, the attributive account, in contrast, understands the relation 
between an individual and that individual’s name as that of relating that individual to a property 
that is, in a sense, independent of our use of linguistic expressions. It is instead dependent 
on our practices of property attribution. 
 On Fara’s view, a name’s semantic content is captured by the following schema, which 
I will call “Schema F,” 
 Schema F: 'N’ is true of an object just in case that object is called N. 
In schema F, being called N is to be attributed a property – that of being N. Returning to 
sentence (6), it clearly contains an instance of the attributive use of the expression ‘called’. 
Equally clearly, however, Schema F does not capture the semantic content of the expression 
‘stupid’ since an individual is not stupid in virtue of its being attributed to them. The same is 
true of most common nouns. Suppose that instead of discussing Maude’s intelligence, 
speakers begin to discuss Maude’s weight instead. And suppose Maude has gained weight 
lately. A colleague utters the following sentence to another behind Maude’s back:  
              (9) Maude has become a real whale. 
In uttering sentence (9), Maude’s colleague calls Maude a whale, using it in its metaphorical 
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sense. But Schema F does not capture the semantic content of the expression ‘whale’ either, 
metaphorically or otherwise. Like the expression ‘stupid’, the expression ‘whale’ is true of an 
individual metaphorically or otherwise in virtue of facts that have nothing to do with whether 
any speakers call that individual a whale or not. 
 Fara claims that the same is not true, however, of sentence (4). In this case, Fara 
claims that Schema F does capture the nature of being called Willard. 'Willard' is true of an 
object just in case that object is attributed the property of being Willard. On this view, then 
names are predicates, and they have properties as their semantic content. This idea is novel, 
and fruitful.  
5. Three Advantages of the Attributive Account  
Fara points out three advantages of the attributive view: it can avoid Kripke’s informativeness 
objection to meta-linguistic accounts; it can explain the discrepancies between the truth 
values in sentences (3) and (4); and last, it can explain the apparent stability of an individual’s 
name.  
5.1 The Informativeness of the Attributive Account 
Fara’s argument that her account is informative begins with an application of her schema to 
the predicate ‘stupid’. As we saw, the use of the expression ‘stupid’ in sentence (6) concerning 
Maude, at least, is clearly false, since attributing stupidity to an individual does not make it 
true that they are in fact stupid particularly in Maude’s case.  
 Fara then argues that If Schema F is false when applied to the predicate ‘stupid’, then 
since names are predicates, the attributive account of proper names must be informative due 
to the possibility of Schema F being false – a criterion standardly used to distinguish scientific 
claims from pseudo-scientific claims. According to Fara, “if the being-called condition for the 
applicability of names as predicates were trivially true, then analogous schemata for other 
predicates would be trivially true” (2011b, p.499). But they are not. Therefore, Schema F is 
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an informative account of the semantic content of a name. 
5.2 The Predictive Adequacy of the Attributive Account 
Concerning the difference in the truth values of sentences (3) and (4), on the attributive 
account, sentence (3) is false since Quine is not addressed with the expression ‘Willard’, but 
‘Will’. Nevertheless, Quine’s name is Willard and on the attributive account the truth of 
sentence (4), which is about the attribution of the property of being Willard to Quine, is true 
since Quine does in fact have the name ‘Willard’. The difference in truth values between (3) 
and (4) therefore can both be predicted and explained by the attributive account.  
5.3 The Stability of Names 
Fara’s conception of meta-linguistic calling is that being addressed as, and speakers can 
address any individual using any expression they like, such as they do in calling Quine ‘Will’ 
instead of ‘Willard’. But such acts do not imbue individuals with the names by which they are 
addressed. Quine’s name is ‘Willard’ whether others call him ‘Will’ or not. The attributive 
account of names can explain this stability since individuals are imbued with names by being 
attributed the property of having that name and let us suppose that having a property is a 
more stable fact about an individual than how speakers choose to address them.  
6. Analyzing the Argument for the Attributive Notion of Calling 
Clearly, Fara has made a compelling case for the claim that there is more than one notion of 
calling, and that one such notion is that of property attribution. She then uses this notion to 
analyze the semantic content of names. One question that arises is whether there might be 
yet other notions of calling. I show that there are, and that the arguments for them have the 
very same structure as those offered for the attributive notion. If this is correct, then we need 
an independent reason for believing that an analysis of names ought to invoke Fara’s 
understanding of calling as opposed to a different notion.  
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6.1 Calling as Summoning 
I will now show that there are notions of calling in addition to the attributive notion. And that 
at least two of these can be argued for using the very same kind of arguments that Fara uses 
in illustrating that there is an attributive notion of calling. 
 First, consider the fact that my dog’s name is ‘Jackson’, and that I often call him to 
come inside, as I might do by using this sentence 
              (10) I called ‘Jackson’. 
Just like sentence (3), sentence (10) is in fact made true by facts about how speakers address 
one another. 
 Now consider this sentence as a report on the action performed by my utterance of 
sentence (10): 
              (11) I called Jackson.  
This sentence is not made true in virtue of the use of any expression. It is not meta-linguistic. 
This can be demonstrated since calling a dog by name is an ineffective way of summoning 
them. Instead, the word ‘come’ or ‘inside’ or some other word ought to be used consistently. 
Just as there are truth value discrepancies between Fara’s sentence’s (3) and (4), this is also 
true of sentences (10) and (11). Given the facts, sentence (10) is likely false, while sentence 
(11) could still be true. In fact, just like Fara’s sentence (7), I could sensibly utter this sentence 
to my dog-sitter: 
               (12) You can call Jackson, just don’t call ‘Jackson’. 
This case also allows for a multitude of ways that I might call Jackson similar to Fara’s point 
that calling Maude stupid can also be done in more than one way.  
 There is, therefore, a notion of calling that is non-meta-linguistic, but is also not an 
attributive notion. This second notion was derived by using the same types of examples that 
Fara does to prove that there is an attributive notion. There may be others and it may turn out 
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that one of these other notions of calling is a more suitable interpretation of Schema F as an 
account of a name’s semantic content than Fara’s attributive interpretation.  
6.2 Calling as Recognition 
There are reasons to believe that there is also a notion of calling that should be understood 
in terms of recognition or to bring attention to a particular individual. Imagine a new professor 
in the first class of the semester who sees an unknown student with her hand raised wearing 
a t-shirt with the expression ‘Baby Phat’ written on it. The professor calls on the student by 
embarrassingly blurting out: Yes, Phat-girl. This embarrassing moment might be objectively 
reported on by uttering the following sentence: 
              (13) The professor called Phat-girl to answer her question. 
Certainly, if the expression ‘Phat-girl’ were simply being mentioned, sentence (13) would not 
make sense, but it does. Suppose the student’s real name is 'Susan'. The name ‘Susan’ could 
be substituted for the occurrence of ‘Phat-girl’ in sentence (13), and it would not change its 
meaning. Like Fara’s example that uses the predicate ‘dumb’ in sentence (8) instead of 
'stupid' to illustrate that calling can be understood as the attribution of a property, and not 
simply meta-linguistically, sentence (13) also illustrates that calling should not simply be 
understood meta-linguistically. However, this case does not illustrate that the notion of calling 
in play is one of property attribution. In fact, the entire scenario is embarrassing or funny, 
depending on your perspective, exactly for this reason. Now there is a third notion of calling 
in play illustrated again by using the same types of reasons that Fara offers in favor of the 
existence of an attributive notion. In fact, the third notion might be a reasonable interpretation 
of Schema F:  
              Schema F: 'N’ is true of an object just in case that object is called/recognized as N. 




7. Analyzing the Argument for an Attributive Account of Proper Names 
After illustrating that there is an attributive notion of calling, Fara then justifies interpreting 
Schema F – a general characterization of the predicate expressed by a name – as invoking 
this notion of calling by arguing that it is informative. She shows this by showing that Schema 
F is false when applied to the predicate ‘stupid’, and names are predicates just like ‘stupid’. 
Fara’s argument for the attributive account of proper names, then, is an argument from 
analogy, as her own assertions previously quoted would indicate. If so, then any differences 
between ordinary predicates and name predicates need explanation.  
7.1 Syntactic Differences between Ordinary and Name Predicates 
There are significant syntactic differences between predicates like ‘stupid’ and so-called 
name-predicates that are not addressed by the attributive account. For instance, ‘stupid’ can 
occur as an adjective in a sentence: 
              (14) The stupid, enormous, wild turkey walked over the cliff, 
whereas we cannot sensibly utter this sentence 
    (15) The stupid, Johnish, wild turkey walked over the cliff. 
Or consider the fact that the expression ‘whale’ cannot occur as the nominal head of a 
sentence unless it is pluralized or bound, but this is not true of proper names. 
    (16) Whale is a fascinating animal 
is not a grammatical sentence, but  
    (17) John is a fascinating animal 
Is a grammatical sentence. 
 Ordinary predicates can also be verbs, as in this sentence  
              (18) The fisher went out whaling. 
But proper names cannot be so used. This is not a sentence that anyone would find 
immediately acceptable: 
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    (19) He was Elvising on the dance floor.  
7.2 Semantic Differences between Ordinary and Name Predicates 
Semantically, the predicate ‘stupid’ represents qualities that are independent of any linguistic 
practices or even practices of property attribution. In fact, this is what allows Fara to use the 
predicate ‘stupid’ to prove the falsifiability of Schema F. Names like ‘John’, however, do not 
represent significant robust qualities. Being John is to be nothing more than to happen to 
have the name John. That is, in the case of a name, what linguistic independent quality does 
an individual have in being called the name ‘John’? None it would seem – other than being 
called John. The name ‘John’ unlike ‘stupid’ has no meaning outside of its attributions to 
individuals.  
 Furthermore, unlike calling someone stupid, or a metaphorical whale, which we can 
do in multiple ways, having the property of being John is a sui generis property. There is no 
way to call someone a John other than to attribute to that individual the property of being 
John. 
 In response, the attributivist might point out that it is false that names have no 
substitutes. We do in fact have diverse ways of calling people the same name, for instance, 
across different languages, or in cases in which someone adopts a persona with a name not 
assigned at birth (these cases are more controversial). For example, we can call someone 
John in English by attributing to an individual the property of being John, and in French we 
attribute this very same property by attributing to an individual the property of being Jean, at 
least as far as Canadians are concerned the name ‘John’ and ‘Jean’ are versions of the same 
name.  
 Whether these in fact do express the same property, however, can be questioned by 
applying Schema F. Imagine, for instance, a French individual, baptized using the name 
‘Jean’, and consider this French sentence produced by applying Fara’s schema to the French 
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name ‘Jean’: 
              (20) ‘Jean' est vrai d'un objet ssi cet objet est appelé Jean. 
 
Now if 'Jean' is simply is the French version of the English name 'John', sentence (20) 
translated into English should result in this sentence:  
   (21) 'Jean' is true of an object iff that object is called John. 
If the attributive account were correct, then, and ‘Jean’ and ‘John’ are simply synonyms, then 
sentences (20) and (21) should both be true, since each name should express the same 
property, just as we saw with sentences (5) and (6).  
 In fact, if the attributivist accepts the customary practice of treating the names ‘John’ 
and ‘Jean’ as synonyms, the following sentence should seem as natural as a sentence like 
(7) does: 
   (22) You can call me ‘John’, just don't call me John.  
But sentence (22) does not sound like a natural thing to say at all. It seems it would be a 
rather odd thing to say. In fact, even maintaining that sentence (21) is true seems odd.  
I claim that the oddness of sentences (21) and (22) is caused by the attempt to 
interpret them attributively. Attributive interpretations, as mentioned, require predicating 
substantive qualitative properties of an individual – they are descriptive properties. That is, 
attributive readings can get a foothold only when we have certain qualities associated with 
certain predicates that are independent of any actions on the part of speakers. This is the 
reason that calling someone stupid is bothersome to the individual so-called – because of the 
meaning of the word ‘stupid’ as illustrated in sentence (7). But this explanation seems 
implausible concerning sentences (21) and (22).  
First, sentence (21) does not even appear to be true as it should on the attributivist 
account. Second, any offense that Jean might express using sentence (22) is not explained 
in virtue of having a negative property attributed to him, but rather, it has to do with a misuse 
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of language – a meta-linguistic fact. I claim that there is, in fact, no quality is associated with 
being called by a specific name like ‘John’. And this is the reason that sentences (21) and 
(22) cannot be interpreted attributively. The attributivist, then, faces one of two options: give 
a plausible account of the nature of the property of say being a John that accounts for its 
difference from ordinary predicates within an attributivist framework, or deny that ‘Jean’ and 
‘John’ are synonyms – an intuition many speakers share.  
 My own idea about the difference between ordinary predicates and names, is that if 
their semantic content is in fact a property at all, then names must have what I call 
“prescriptive properties” as their content. Properties that are true of individuals by enactment 
or by decree. Being stupid and being a whale are what I will call “descriptive properties.” 
These properties are true of individuals in virtue of objective facts that are independent of any 
intentional actions and have nothing to do with attributing them to any individuals. For 
instance, it is not sufficient to call Maude stupid, as a speaker might by using sentence (6), 
since being stupid is a property independent of its being attributed to any individuals – other 
factors are in play having to do with what it is to be stupid. 
8. Other Objections to the Attributive Account 
There are at least three more objections to the attributive account concerning the analysis of 
attributive calling as an account of proper names. First, I argue that the account is not truly 
informative in a way that responds to Kripke’s worries. Second, I point out that property 
attributions subject to whim just as much as the meta-linguistic notion of calling understood 
as addressing a subject. Last, I argue that treating names as expressing descriptive 
properties has potential implausible consequences for an account of the nature of giving 
names. 
8.1 Is the Attributive Account Truly Informative? 
Fara assumes that it is sufficient to prove that a claim is informative is that is falsifiable, and 
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she shows that her schema for representing the semantic content of a proper name is indeed 
falsifiable, assuming that a name is a predicate. However, Fara’s assumption that falsifiability 
establishes the informativeness of a semantic analysis is questionable.  
 In fact, counterexamples showing that falsifiability is neither a necessary nor a 
sufficient condition for a claim’s informativeness can be found in Kripke’s own work. For 
instance, Kripke discusses the practice of stipulating the length of a meter for measurement 
purposes, in which we simply decide that a certain stick shall count as a meter in length. This 
claim is falsifiable, since the stick could have been other than a meter long, and yet the claim 
is not informative due to its stipulative nature. Therefore, falsifiability is not a sufficient criterion 
of informativeness. Kripke also considers the long-standing puzzle of how an identity 
statement could be necessary and yet fail to be a priori. For instance, the fact that that the 
celestial body seen rising in the morning then called “Hesperus” is identical to the celestial 
body rising in the evening known as “Phosphorus” – the planet Venus – and yet we failed to 
know that Hesperus was identical to Phosphorous. At one time, Hesperus is Phosphorus was 
informative, but it was never falsifiable. Therefore, falsifiability is also not a necessary 
condition for informativeness. 
8.2 Property Attributions as Arbitrary 
On the attributive account, as discussed, being called a name is to be the subject of a property 
attribution. But, of course, any speaker can attribute any property they like to any individual 
they like whenever they like. The same is true of being addressed as. A speaker may address 
any individual in any way they choose. What then makes the attributive account one that can 
explain the stability of names? As before, an attributive account of the semantic content of 
names then must be constrained in other ways as well. But what then is particularly attractive 
about the attributive account at all? As just illustrated, it is not informative in the way it should 
be and it cannot explain the stability of names, since it needs other constraints to do this 
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work.4 All that is left, then, is the advantage that it can allow for sentences like (5) and (6) to 
vary in truth value. But is this enough reason to accept it? Given the issues I have raised, I 
do not believe so. And there is yet another issue: the attributive account has odd 
consequences for a theory of acts of naming, or name acquisition.  
8.3 The Attributive Account and Name Acquisition 
Kripke, in raising the issue of informativeness, also asks another question about names that 
casts doubt on the idea that being called a name is a meta-linguistic affair. Specifically, he 
asks whether it is true that Socrates was called ‘Socrates’? It is likely that the answer is “no.” 
The fact that Socrates is addressed as ‘Socrates’ does not entail that this is the expression 
that was used to dub or name him initially. 
 The attributive account would explain the previous facts by appealing to the ambiguity 
of the notion of calling. It is of course true that Socrates is currently addressed as such, but 
this does not entail that he was named ‘Socrates’. For the latter to be true, Socrates had to 
be attributed the property of being Socrates. According to Fara, being given a name, and 
therefore having a certain name, for example, her own name, cannot depend on how she is 
currently addressed. Concerning the acquisition of her own name, she says: 
My parents called me Delia Ruby Graff when I was born – that's what made it the case 
that I was called Delia Ruby Graff. I added 'Fara' as an adult — that's what made it 
the case that I am now called Delia Ruby Graff Fara. But I have never heard anyone 
call me 'Delia Ruby Graff Fara'; I doubt that anyone ever has. So, although I am now 
called Delia Ruby Graff Fara, I have never been called 'Delia Ruby Graff Fara' (2011b., 
p. 6). 
 
Her explanation for the fact that her name is Delia Ruby Graff Fara, but she has never been 
so addressed, is that acquiring a name requires more than being addressed by it, it must be 
 
4 Something to note about the attributive account is that it potentially inherits all of the features 
of semantic instrumentalism about names, except as applied to properties, since on this view, 
introducing a name just is to introduce a property. 
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attributed as a property. However, given the fact that even property attributions are arbitrary, 
as I pointed out, it cannot merely be this fact that explains how an individual acquires a certain 
name as a stable means of identifying them. 
 Furthermore, the existence of names that we treat as synonymous, such as ‘John’ and 
‘Jean’, just like ‘stupid’ and ‘dumb’, also illustrate that the attributive account cannot exhaust 
an account of name acquisition. If acquiring a name was simply to be attributed a certain 
property, then it should be perfectly acceptable to name an individual Jean by using the 
expression ‘John’ to do so. It is false, however, that a speaker can give a name to an individual 
by uttering expressions other than their actual name – that name acquisition is entirely free 
of any meta-linguistic facts. If this were true, an individual could acquire a name that is never 
mentioned at all. And this seems wrong. Surely mentioning an expression must play a role in 
acquiring a name, even if this does not determine its semantic content. 
9. Name Acquisition as a Meta-linguistic Performative Act: Naming and Calling 
I claim that the attributivist’s complete rejection of meta-linguistic facts as connected in any 
way with names is based on impoverished notion of meta-linguistic facts. For instance, the 
attributivist argues that because meta-linguistic acts of calling are arbitrary one-off acts, and 
since our use of proper names does not fit this pattern, meta-linguistic facts are irrelevant 
concerning an account of names. This argument assumes, however, that the only way acts 
of naming could be meta-linguistic is if a speaker mentions a name by uttering it to address 
a certain individual. But meta-linguistic acts need not involve directly addressing someone 
with a particular expression. For instance, filling out a form for an individual’s birth certificate 
that requires mentioning that individual’s name is a meta-linguistic act. So is filling out 
documents to obtain a marriage certificate. 
  I propose instead that there is more to meta-linguistic acts of calling than the attributive 
theorist allows as the previous examples illustrate. Concerning names, I claim that an act of 
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giving a name should be thought of as a type of speech act – a performative meta-linguistic 
speech act (Austin, 1962). A performative linguistic act is one that brings about a certain 
effect, as when a speaker utters the words ‘I promise’, and thereby makes it true that they 
have made a promise, or when speaker utters ‘I do’ during a wedding ceremony, and thereby 
makes it true that a couple is then married. Performative meta-linguistic speech acts are those 
that make changes in the world in a way that that change is essentially tied to the words 
mentioned in that act. Naming or coining terms would be examples of such acts.  
 So, that Quine is named ‘Willard’ is explained by the fact that his parents engaged in 
the meta-linguistic performative speech act of calling him ‘Willard’ in which mentioning of 
‘Willard’ was essential to achieve the end of giving Quine that name, unlike other non-meta-
linguistic performatives such as promising. Now how does this idea apply to Fara’s sentences 
(3) and (4)? Of course, if it seems obvious that sentence (3) could be false since the name 
‘Willard’ may never get mentioned in connection with Quine ever again after he is so named. 
To explain this, I will invoke another concept – that of constative speech acts (Austin, 1962). 
A constative speech act is one that is descriptive or reportive in nature. For example, after 
engaging in the performative of promising by a speaker, a hearer might report this fact by 
stating that that speaker promised to do something. In making constative statements about 
meta-linguistic facts, a speaker may be reporting on either descriptive speech reports or on 
meta-linguistic performatives that have normative consequences.  
 I claim, then, that the reason that sentences (3) and (4) can vary in truth value is 
because those sentences can be interpreted as reporting on distinct kinds of facts – 
descriptive and normative meta-linguistic facts. 5  That is, meta-linguistic calling is itself 
 
5 I invoke this distinction now, but I am not entirely committed to it, yet. It may need to be 
replaced with a different distinction.  
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ambiguous. As a descriptive statement, sentence (3) of course might be false, as it depends 
on facts about actual linguistic usage of expressions. My own way of marking this difference 
is to invoke the double-quote/single-quote distinction, since the use of double-quotes to mark 
direct speech reports is already familiar. The use of single-quotes and a general account of 
its nature I leave for future work, but I assume here that they are to be used when reporting 
on meta-linguistic performatives. This, at least, leaves room for an explanation of the 
difference Fara notes between sentences (3) and (4). I claim that sentence (3) should be 
displayed in this way: 
              (3)* Quine was called “Willard.” 
The double quotes indicating that it is about direct speech reports. In contrast, sentence (4), 
would contain only single quotes. In this case, indicating that a particular meta-linguistic 
performative had occurred, which I would write this way: 
             (4)* Quine was called ‘Willard’  
Because sentence (4)* reports on a normative meta-linguistic fact, and its normativity explains 
why ‘Willard’ is Quine’s name as opposed to simply an expression used to address him.   
 While this idea clearly needs further elaboration, I sketch it here simply to illustrate 
that alternative explanations of Fara’s data are available. In other work (2020), I develop the 
idea in detail, explain why it is not subject to Kripke’s informativeness objection, and how it 
can be used to explain being competent in the use of a name.   
10. Conclusion 
I conclude that the real issue, for the attributivist, centers around giving an account of the 
nature of the special authoritative calling relation underlying acts of naming, which are 
sufficient, on the attributive view, to make a name predicate apply to an object, as distinct 
from those predicates whose application conditions are not settled by linguistic practice alone. 
On the attributive view, the answer is to be found in an analysis of the phenomenon of 
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attributive calling itself. On my reading of Kripke, it was this deeper kind of explanation he 
was seeking that the attributive account does not yet provide.6  
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